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Purpose: Enforcement is reported as key to effective corporate governance. But in an emerging 
nation like Nigeria, where structures and enforcement mechanisms have been reported weak, 
there is the need to examine factors responsible. This paper takes steps towards developing a 
stakeholder perspective to examine any relationship between enforcement structures and board 
performance for effective corporate functioning. 
Methodology: Based on survey perceptions of 154 respondents from the Nigerian regulatory 
enforcement agencies and sampled public firms, the study employs confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) in a structural equation modeling (SEM) approach; a model that relates three 
enforcement structure variables to board performance is proposed. 
Findings: Building upon enforcement structure construct based on stakeholder framework, the 
study found the dimensions of regulatory capacity, monitoring compliance, and enforcement 
mechanisms as the valid measures. The study concludes that enforcement has significant effect 
on board performance. However, regulatory capacity indicators correlate as valid measures. 
Hence, confirmed through CFA and the structural model (SEM). 
Originality: The paper explores new research idea on board and focus on strenghtening 
regulatory framework by Nigerian enforcement agencies. This adds to knowledge, enhances 
regulatory capacity and reduce conflicts of interests. The SEM approach exposes firms to an 
appropriate and efficient legal, regulatory and institutional foundation upon which all market 
participants can rely in establishing their contractual relations for effective functioning. 
Keywords: Enforcement Structure, Regulatory Capacity, Monitoring Compliance, 




As a result of prevailing reported cases of unethical practices in corporate entities, attributable 
to poor governance and weak enforcement that led to many corporate failures; countries, 
multilateral organizations and professional bodies seek ways of checkmating the ugly menace. 
Nations review existing regulations and codes, enacting new laws and new regulations and 
instituting more proactive steps to strengthening compliance with accounting and governance 
rules (Okereke, 2007). Though countries may differ in establishing their corporate statutory 
frameworks, the general pattern has been the government regulations and professional bodies.  
On this interest, Brennan & Solomon (2008) encourage broader theoretical perspectives, 
methodological approaches, accountability mechanisms, sector analysis, developing economy 
studies and time horizon. The authors affirm that regulation is a mechanism of governance, and 
is usually studied at the country level (La Porta et al., 1998) or the firm. They adopt an 
analytical frame of reference, and locate seven studies in the special issue in a framework of 




analysis showing how each one contributes to the field. Some are relevant to the focus of this 
paper. For example, using stakeholder theory, Collier (2008) focuses on regulators, lenders and 
tenants as other dimensions of corporate governance.  
In this respect, perhaps influenced by the common-law similarities or a case of 
forceful/voluntary legal transplant, the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 
(CAMA) is largely modeled on the UK Company Act 1948. According to Rashidah and 
Mohammed (2010), the imposition of colonial laws is an example of forced transplant, while 
borrowing of laws for the purpose of legal harmonization is an example of voluntary transplant. 
In the area of corporate governance, concepts and ideas, as well as laws and regulations are 
freely borrowed between jurisdictions (Rashidah & Mohammed, 2010). Hence, countries once 
colonized by the British would adopt UK Companies Act. Under the Nigerian CAMA, section 
310-312 allows minority shareholders to seek redress in court against any governance 
malfunction. However, Amao & Amaeshi (2007) observe that despite the statutory provisions; 
communication gap, lack of timely and inappropriate AGM information, apathy, and weak 
judicial court system to check management excesses, all hinder coordinated board progress. 
In addition, Berglof and Claessens (2004) assert that in many developing and transition 
countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms will be effective because 
the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function 
poorly. They affirm that enforcement more than regulation or voluntary code is the key to 
effective corporate governance. They provide a framework for linkage, as they affect firms’ 
ability to commit to outside investors and other stakeholders. In line with their findings, 
specific Nigerian studies found governance structure characterized by weak compliance and 
enforcement (World Bank, 2004; Wilson, 2006), which could hinder board performance.  
In this circumstance, policymakers normally focus on increased deterrence, which in practice 
usually means more enforcement. After all, if compliance is 100%, there will be less need for 
enforcement. Therefore, this necessitates that; Nigerian firms ought to strengthen internal 
enforcement mechanisms to complement the public regulatory enforcement bodies and 
empower them with full capacity to monitor and enforce compliance with governance rules for 
optimum benefits (World Bank, 2004). Though effective enforcement requires a lot of 
expenditure, it is assumed that the benefits the economy yields may outweigh the cost. 
Therefore, dimensions of enforcement structures could explain effective board performance. 
As a motivation for this paper, the voluntary status of the Nigerian code means legal sanctions 
are not provided for non-compliance. However, Berglof and Claessens (2004) report that 
enforcement more than voluntary code is the key to effective corporate governance in transition 
and developing countries. In addition, World Bank (2004) reports Nigerian regulatory 
enforcement bodies lack the capacity to enforce compliance with regulations, coupled with 
very low penalties for major offences (Okike, 2007). This is not desirable in a lower middle 
income country craving for local and foreign investments to boost economy. Thus, the need for 
functional structures and managerial control to protect outside investor. In this regard, Doidge, 
Kardyi & Stulz (2007) report that, the presence of legal and regulatory protections for investors 
explain up to 73% of the decision to invest. By implication, gaining investor confidence 
through coordinated board performance can help Nigeria come up in the rankings, which will 
lead to increased foreign investments, employment generation, enforcing contracts and less 
cost of monitoring.  




The paper proceeds with the review of relevant literature and hypothesis development in 
section 2. How the research was conducted is explained in the methodology section. Data 
analysis and the research findings are presented in section 4. The paper discusses the findings, 
relates implications for theory, practice and regulatory policy, and finally conclusion is 
presented with agenda for future research in section 5.  
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
The subject of enforcement has attracted increased attention in recent years. Berglof and 
Claessens (2004) opine that enforcement more than regulations or voluntary codes is the key 
to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate 
governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms’ ability to 
commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. The authors further observe 
that when the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms 
function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate 
governance mechanisms are effective. In other words, effective industry (internal) and 
regulatory agencies (external) enforcement mechanisms can mitigate the potential costs that 
come along with these structures if the goals are to be achieved.  
Dewing and Russell (2008) examine corporate governance regulation from the individual 
regulated. They use content analysis to examine the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the 
UK, they also interview high-level individuals in the financial services industry and by way of 
illustration, they analyze the outcome of FSA enforcement actions against individuals. 
Similarly, Stein (2008) examines the regulatory reform of US SOX to normalize the behavior 
of managers and accountants.  
 
In a related development, Brown and Tarca (2005; 2007) observe that, the goals are less likely 
to be achieved without regulatory oversight that promotes rigorous monitoring and consistent 
enforcement of applicable accounting standards. This means that governance standard setting 
is futile in the absence of enforcement, and as such, the extents to which governance standards 
are enforced and violations prosecuted are as important as the standards themselves. 
Furthermore, Saudagaran & Diga (1997) opine that, “the best accounting standards are only as 
good as the effectiveness of the regulatory process”. They affirm that, in an emerging capital 
market, systematic inquiry needs to be made regarding the strength of the regulatory 
mechanisms, and factors limiting their effectiveness. They further opine that, the enforcement 
stage in emerging capital markets should be given to the entity equipped with the power to 
enforce, which is the government. Government agencies will perform functions similar to the 
SEC in the US: formulating rules for issuance of securities, approving offers of securities and 
listings, and defining the overall direction (governance) of capital market development.  
 
Conversely, as the emerging capital market reach a particular size and attain a greater number 
of well trained professionals, regulators may allow the private sector, i.e. stock exchanges to 
play more active role in enforcing governance standards since in many developing countries 
enforcement is a big problem. This is because corporations, akin with human behavior are 
likely to take advantage if nobody takes action when rules are breached; the result is that the 
rules remain requirement only on paper (Hope, 2002).  




A definition of enforcement has been provided by the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR, 2003). “Enforcement is monitoring compliance of financial information 
with the reporting framework and taking action in the case of infringements.” This means that, 
for any enforcement body or mechanism to function effectively, it must have a quality reporting 
framework issued and developed by experts in accounting and auditing. Enforcement differs 
significantly across countries, even being non-existent in some countries. However, even in the 
EU and other regions across the world, several countries do not have an oversight system. The 
several EU countries needed to set up enforcement mechanisms or extend the activities of 
existing enforcement bodies (CESR, 2003). A study conducted by Brown and Tarca (2005) 
explore matters regarding uniform enforcement in the EU. They reviewed activities in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in setting up and modifying enforcement bodies before 
2005. They tested current developments against the Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens 
FEE (2002) recommendations and against the principles for effective enforcement proposed in 
CESR (2003). They conducted 23 interviews to representatives of the countries’ enforcement 
bodies. To complement their data, they gathered views from top four big audit firms, the IASB, 
FEE and EFRAG about the challenges of achieving effective uniform enforcement. They found 
that, since enforcement remains the responsibility of each EU member state, the goal of 
uniform enforcement raised a particular challenge, namely the coordination of enforcement 
activities and sanctions and that uniform international standards can only be maintained if 
interpretation advice emanates from a central source, in this case the IASB and IFRIC. 
The FEE (2002) essential features for an effective enforcement body are: support for high 
quality corporate governance and external audit; high quality, expert, globally consistent 
decisions on important issues; freedom from bias; transparency and clear procedures; 
confidentiality and speed of action; avoidance of making detailed accounting rules; focusing 
resources; rectification of defective financial information; and finally, sanctions. 
In addition, the principles guiding effective enforcement recommended by CESR (2003) are: 
the purpose of enforcement; definition of enforcement; competent enforcement bodies; 
delegated responsibility; compliance with the standard; features of enforcement bodies; 
powers; responsibilities; application; documents; ex-post enforcement; ex-ante enforcement; 
procedures; interim procedure; extent of review; material misstatement; and enforcement 
actions.    
In the foregoing, this means that a country’s judicial system might be functioning well but 
enforcement of regulations lacking. It is difficult, however, to think of a situation in which the 
judicial system in general works poorly (as the case in Nigeria) but enforcement of standards 
is strong. The assessment of judicial efficiency produced by the country-risk rating agency 
Business International Corporation “may be taken to represent investors’ assessment of 
conditions in the country in question” (La Porta et al., 1998). The second component of 
enforcement, rule of law, as seen in Hope (2002) assesses a country’s law and other tradition 
(La Porta et al., 1998). If no one cares, regulations covering the content of financial reports are 
not likely to be effective. Assessments of tradition for law and order are produced by the 
country-risk rating agency ‘International Country Risk’.  
While academics and practitioners agree on the importance of enforcement as an essential 
element of the corporate governance infrastructure, there has been little research on 
enforcement in an international setting. One potential explanation for this is that it is not easy 
to measure enforcement across countries (Brown and Tarca, 2007, 2005; and Hope, 2002). 




Likewise, it is also difficult to measure enforcement on firm-level components but it remains 
an important constituent of corporate governance especially in emerging Nigerian market. 
In Nigeria, World Bank (2004) reports enforcement to be weak. The team stated that powers 
of the regulatory enforcement bodies are important because of the relatively inefficient court 
system. The perception in the market is that while the court system is actively used to resolve 
shareholder disputes, it takes many years to receive a judgment. Therefore, a lot depends on 
the powers granted to the regulatory bodies, such as the SEC, CBN, NAICOM and the NASB. 
As earlier stated, according to World Bank (2004) report, the SEC does not have an effective 
mechanism for monitoring compliance or for punishing issuers that violates the rules since no 
effective regulatory mechanisms exist to impose sanctions on managers and boards. The only 
current penalties are fines and de-listing. However, since the number of listings is seen as a 
measure of the success of the stock exchange, relative to its international competitors, the de-
listing penalty is rarely applied.  
Moreover, there is the need to review the current legislation on penalty of fines in the Corporate 
Affairs Commission (CAC) because Okike (2007) observes that if the CAC is to fulfill its role 
of adequately promoting good corporate governance, its monitoring role needs to be 
strengthened, and more realistic sanctions applied to erring companies. For example, the 
penalty for contravening section 19(3) of the Act is N25, the equivalent of $0.16 cents, which 
is the number of persons that can form a company, association or partnership. Also, the penalty 
of contravening section 348(1-3) of CAMA 1990 in relation to defective financial statements 
for companies is N100 ($0.66 cents) and for group financial statements, the penalty is N250 
($1.66). Obviously, companies may opt to pay this token amount and present financial 
statements that do not give a “true and fair view” since the punishment in the legislation is not 
sufficient to serve as deterrence. In other words, where compliance with standards is legally 
required, companies may not comply if it is perceived that the consequences of non compliance 
are not serious (Okike, 2007).    
Similarly, Obazee (2009) reports the need to address institutional issues, especially those 
relating to enforcement. He observes that, with the confusion created by multiplicity of laws in 
Nigerian regulatory bodies, enforcement should be clearly vested on one body, such as 
Financial Reporting Council (consistent with World Bank recommendation) in order to avoid 
many non-compliance issues passing unnoticed.  
Hence, reported weak enforcement affect corporate governance as well, because the Nigerian 
Accounting Standards Board is also responsible for preparing governance standards and all 
corporations and enforcement agencies are guided by the same legislation, which has direct 
effects on Nigerian listed firms. For example, financial statements that lack the required 
qualities can be considered inaccurate and misleading, which perhaps are prepared with the 
intention to deceive or conceal some ulterior motives by officers responsible for their 
preparation. Such deceptions could be, among others, lead to concealment and distortion of 
accounting records, falsification and/or omission of transactions, deliberate misapplication of 
governance rules to perpetrate frauds, which indicate consequences of weak enforcement.  
Akin to nations with emerged capital markets, there have been so many reported cases of 
financial scandals in Nigeria. This makes it imperative to overhaul the present regulatory 
framework as recommended by local and international researchers. As a step-forward, the 
Nigerian government has started responding to some of the recommendations by establishing 
a financial reporting council (FRC), in place of the current Nigerian Accounting Standards 




Board. This is an important policy decision because the establishment of an oversight body 
such as the FRC is one of the requirements of the European Union to allow financial audit in 
its jurisdiction. So far only two African countries meet the requirement, South Africa and 
Mauritius. The Financial Reporting Council in Nigeria is responsible for issuing accounting, 
auditing and governance standards for both private and public sectors. It is also the only body 
responsible for licensing, regulating, and ensuring compliance and enforcement of the 
standards. As an oversight body, it provides a barrier against undue influence by bodies (seven 
directorates) constituting its establishment ICAN (2009). But its effective functions, in addition 
to the rules backing it, largely depends on functional enforcement mechanisms. 
Also, on behalf of the SEC, the Nigerian Stock Exchange monitors compliance with financial 
reporting requirements of companies, whose equity or debt securities are publicly traded. The 
capacity of SEC to effectively monitor compliance with accounting standards is inadequate, 
though it is undergoing re-organization. There have been instances where companies have been 
suspended from the NSE for breach of financial reporting requirements. However, SEC 
enforcement is weak, and administrative sanctions (e.g. restatement at the cost of the company) 
and civil penalties are not adequate to deter non-compliance (World Bank, 2004). 
According to OECD (2004), to ensure an efficient corporate governance structure, it is essential 
that an appropriate and efficient legal, regulatory and institutional foundation be established 
upon which all market participants can rely in establishing their private contractual relations. 
The OECD (2004) principles of corporate governance further state that a corporate governance 
framework will typically comprise elements such as legislation, regulation, voluntary 
commitments, and business practices that are based on a country’s specific circumstances such 
as history and tradition. On the wave of this interest, new experiences are being witnessed even 
in Africa, judging from the worldwide trend of recognizing other significant stakeholders in 
governance structures for sustainability, and the changed business circumstances of achieving 
wider objective functions (King Committee, I; II & III). Therefore, an adjustment in the content 
and structure of the governance framework in Nigeria may be required. 
In this respect, it has been mentioned earlier that CAMA (1990) is one of the major corporate 
laws regulating business operations in Nigeria, which provides for the protection of 
shareholders, functions of directors and audit committee. However, weak regulatory 
framework, slow legal processes, and high-level corruption have been reported as factors 
hindering effective corporate governance in Nigeria (World Bank, 2004; Okike, 2004; 2007; 
and Okpara, 2009). Therefore, stakeholder theory view the corporation as an enduring social 
institution, with personality, character and aspirations of its own, with proper interests of a 
wide range of stakeholder groups, and with public responsibilities, such as government 
regulatory and enforcement agencies. 
However, the OECD principles assume that all countries have efficient legal system and the 
means and capabilities to enforce it as obtained in the developed member-nations the 
organization’s principles represent. Stein (2008) examines the impact of government, 
governmental techniques, and regulatory reform to normalize the behavior of managers and 
accountants. The regulations examined are the US SOX, characterizing the power relationships 
of government, and the social construction of corporate governance and reforms through 
autonomous agents, including managers and accountants.  
In developing countries, practices of self-dealing and insider trading are widespread. Such 
offences are usually unpunished because in Nigeria, the penalties are minor (Okike, 2007) and 




even if there are stiff penalties in theory, enforcement is lax (World Bank, 2004; and Okpara, 
2009). Even the professional auditing associations in Nigeria lack the capacity to impose 
effective sanctions on their erring members (World Bank, 2004; and Okike, 2004). Government 
departments and independent regulators responsible for monitoring and enforcement are 
generally weak, and subject to external influence by politicians (Okpara, 2009). Unlike in the 
UK, community whistle-blowing watchdog organizations such as consumer bodies are not well 
developed in Africa (Botha, 2001). On the other hand, regulatory structure in relations to board 
performance, a study in Italy by Zona and Zattoni (2007) indicate that board task performance 
is higher in regulated industries and listed companies, suggesting that the external context does 
influence board conduct and may shape the criteria against which board effectiveness can be 
measured (Pettigrew, 1992). In particular, they suggest that external scrutiny by financial 
investors as in the case of listed corporations and by regulatory authorities as in the case of 
companies operating in regulated industries – encourages the boards to accomplish their tasks 
more effectively. Based on the above assertion, and considering the Italian market is developed 
and widely held, going by the position of Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) that arrangement for 
widely held firms may not be suitable for controlled firms (for example Nigeria). Hence, board 
role performance is likely to be low in regulated emerging markets, and external context may 
not be able to influence board conduct and constitute the benchmark or standard against which 
board competence can be measured.  Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that:  
 
H1 Regulatory structure as manifested by regulatory capacity, monitoring compliance and 
enforcement mechanism is not significantly related to board role performance. 
 
 






































There is widespread recognition that strong board aids adequate investor protection, and other 
relevant stakeholders that can substantially affect public firms, not only in their ability to 
commit to stakeholders, improve firm value, effective board performance, but also the 
development of capital markets, monitoring compliance with regulations, improved 
enforcement stuctures and the growth of the economy in general (Sikka, 2008; Bhagat et al., 
2008; Berglof & Claessens, 2004; and Fassin, 2009). These developments sparked nations, 
academics and rating agencies develop many dimensions of corporate governance and indices 
for evaluating the quality of corporate governance practices in public firms.  
In this regard, Figure 1  presents a theoretical framework model where the exogenous latent 
constructs enforcement structure represented by three reflective dimensions of enforcement 
mechanisms, monitoring compliance and regulatory framework, are measured by 8 items. 
While the endogenous latent construct board performance is measured by 9 items, represented 
by three dimensions of board monitoring role, board service role and board networking role. 
This study uses questionnaire instrument to sample the perceptions of relevant market 
participants, and employs the use of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in a structural equation 
modeling (SEM) approach as the multivariate statistical technique to estimate how the overall 
model tests the data. In other words, indicators are associated with each latent construct and 
are specified by the researcher from an established theoretical framework (Hair et al., 2010).  
Methodology 
Sample: 
The empirical study was carried out using public listed companies in Nigeria as the sample 
frame. Since they are certified corporations, listed companies are chosen because they are 
regulated, easier to obtain data and also more accurate. The population of 318 Nigerian listed 
companies was targeted for the study, but a sample of 154 was achieved. As a first step, an 
informal chat with some middle and high level managers and an overview of the study 
background in the literature confirmed that questionnaire approach was appropriate and logical. 
All the data for the enforcement structure variables were obtained from responses of 5-points 
Likert Scale questionnaire. Great care was taken in adapting the questionnaire, which was 
largely from the findings of previous studies.  
Instrumentation and Measurements:  
As a first step, series of discussions with experts were held, who possess relevant research 
experience in corporate governance. Thus, based on research findings in the literature, the 
survey questionnaire items for the construct were adapted and in some instances developed. In 
addition, the UK Innovation questionnaire largely influenced the adoption of some 
questionnaire items. Though the researcher have not seen any previous efforts that had 
attempted to test similar constructs together, however based on the proactive efforts embarked 
upon, the content validity was deemed adequate. 
As a pre-test process, the research instrument was submitted to four senior academics with 
extensive combined experience in survey research. They were able to provide critical 
assessment of the content (face) validity of each item, as suggested by Rea & Parker (2005). 
The experts suggestions during the questionnaire design and revision process helped ensure a 
close match between the pre-test and final version of the instrument. Piloting of the survey 
instrument is accomplished by administering the questionnaire to a small sample (30) of 
respondents in Nigeria whose responses and general reactions are sought and examined. 
Luckily, all those that participated in the questionnaire pre-test are sufficiently knowledgeable 




about issues of relevance to the field of inquiry. Among them are nine high-level managers, 
one company secretary, and one CEO. 
The questionnaire contained a total of 21 sets of statements including 4 demographic questions. 
Each of these sets of questions required a single response (tick as appropriate in the answer 
options 1-5) for each of a range of items. Each statement was rated by respondents on a range 
of measures scaled from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”. Greater scores mean 
higher level of constructs. Items specific to a given construct were separated from each other 
in the questionnaire to minimize consistency bias and reduce any sense of repetitiveness. 
Additionally, each measure included at least one reverse-coded item. The questionnaire cover 
motivated participation by suggesting the usefulness of the questionnaire as an evaluation tool 
for reflection on participants’ own corporate experience, indicating the amount of time required 
to complete the survey, and assuring participants of anonymity and confidentiality. The field 
operation of these variables is discussed below. 
 
Results: Data Analysis 
All internal consistency reliabilities based on Cronbach’s alphas for the 5-point interval scale 
measurement items are better than the results in the pilot survey. In the main study, the three 
manifest variables measuring board performance and enforcement structure are internally 
consistent with 0.777, 0.842, 0.780 & 0.728, 0.711, and 0.851 respectively. In this paper, the 
data analysis was conducted in two stages. First, as stated above, the scale reliability coefficient 
has been calculated for each of the scales used in enforcement structure and board performance. 
Cronbach’s reliability coefficients ranged from 0.777 to 0.851. Since all the figures are above 
the 0.70 accepted threshold suggested by Hair et al (2010), it shows that the items achieved the 
accepted correlation level to retain them under each scale for further statistical analysis. In this 
respect, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using principal component method with varimax 
rotation were conducted on both board performance and enforcement structure variables to 
examine their dimensionalties not based on any theoretical underpinning. Five items were 
removed because of low communality figures (< 0.5). The remaining measured items were 
confirmed using CFA based on proposed theoretical framework, and the relationships between 
enforcement structure and board performance constructs were empirically tested using 



















Table 1: Reliability of Measurement Items 
 
 
Regulatory Enforcement (Exogenous Variable): 8 items 
Regulatory Framework (3 items)                                                                                 0.728 
Over-regulation create ambiguity, thus a barrier to understanding laws 
Stock market rules are often ignored 
Corruption does not jeopardize performance of regulatory bodies. 
 
Monitoring (3 items)                                                                                                    0.711 
Slow legal process jeopardize monitoring and enforcement outcome 
Staff inadequacy does not weaken monitoring action 
Low budget reduces the capacity to monitor compliance with rules. 
 
  
Enforcement (2 items)                                                                                                  0.851 
Periodic evaluation of enforcement agency staff improves outcome 
Minor penalties for major auditing offences undermine enforcement outcomes. 
 
Board Performance (Endogenous Variable): 
9 Measurement Items                                                                                                       
                                                                                                               Cronbach’s alpha 
Monitoring (3 items)                                                                                                  0.777 
The board engage in succession planning for CEO  
The board evaluates the performance of top executives  
The board controls plans and budget. 
  
Service (4 items)                                                                                                        0.842                                                                                               
The board contributes to the implementation of strategic decisions  
The board takes long-term strategic decisions  
Board’s suggestions frequently improve strategic decisions 
Board benchmark strategic plan with industry data.  
 
Networking (2 items)                                                                                                 0.780 
The board contributes to acceptance of the firm in the environment  
The board provides contacts with relevant stakeholders.  





Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
In contrast to CFA, EFA does not require a priori hypotheses about how indicators are related 
to underlying factors or even the number of factors, hence the term “exploratory” (Kline, 
2005). In other words, there is little direct influence on the correspondence between the 
indicators and the constructs. In this regard, Kline (2005) affirmed that EFA is not generally 
considered a member of SEM family, though it is a statistical technique used for evaluating 
a measurement model. In this study, as a first step, EFA has been performed to evaluate the 
questionnaire items that measure each of the latent constructs through an iterative process. 
The exploratory factor analyses were carried out using the principal component analysis and 
the varimax rotational methods in order to extract the dominant factors and indicators within 
each factor that share common variance. The direct oblimin rotational method is not selected 
for this study because of its assumptions that the factors are correlated with one another. It 
is the correlation of factors that the study intends to confirm for the measurement model 
(CFA) after exploring for the study measures. 
The construct - enforcement structure - was initially measured using an 8-item scale. When 
performing EFA, two items with factor loadings less than 0.5 were removed from the scale. 
Employing the principal components factor analysis (PCA), two factors (6 measured items) 
with an eigenvalue greater than two explained 64% of the variance of enforcement. In table 
2 below, the varimax-rotated factor pattern implies that all the two factors concerned – 
monitoring compliance (MT) and regulatory framework (RT) with the 8-item scale (α = 
0.761, 711; KMO = 0.621; and < .001 @ 5% Sig) measuring the construct present acceptable 
figures to build the latent construct enforcement structures for further statistical analysis. The 

















Table 2: Enforcement Structure (Exogenous Variable) 
Measurement Items Factor 
Loadin 
%  of 
Variance 
 
Slow legal process jeopardizes monitoring & enforcement outcome 0.761 64% 
Staff inadequacy does not weaken monitoring action 0.812  
Low budget reduces capacity to monitor compliance with rules 0.813  
Over-regulation leads to ambiguous laws  0.821  
Stock market rules are often ignored 0.813  
Corruption does not jeopardize performance of regulatory bodies 0.779  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Sampling Adequacy                                                                       .621 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphecity: Appr. Chi-Square                                                               192.243 
                                              df                                                                                         15 
                                              Sig.                                                                                     .000 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) MT                                                                                                .761  
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) RG                                                                                                 .711 
  






Table 3: Board Performance 




Board controls plans and budget 0.788 66% 
Board evaluates performance of top executives 0.850  
Board engage in succession planning for CEO  0.696  
Board takes long time strategic decisions 0.680  
Board’s suggestions frequently improve strategic decisions 0.860  
Board contributes to the implementation of strategic decisions 0.686  
Benchmark strategic plan with industry data  0.789  
Board contributes to the acceptance of the firm in the environment 0.600  
Board provides contacts with relevant stakeholders 0.762  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling                                            .893 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: Approx. Chi-Sq                                         680.081 
                                                                                                                 36 
                       Sig.                                                                                   .000 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α)                                                                              .893 
 
Similarly, three factors with an eigenvalue greater than five explained 66% of the variance 
for the endogenous construct board performance using the principal factor analysis. Two 
items were removed from the scale. The varimax-rotated factor pattern implies that all the 
three factors  concerned – monitoring; service; and networking with the 11-item scale (α = 
0.893; KMO = 0.893; and < .001 Sig) measuring the construct present acceptable figures to 
build the latent construct board performance for further statistical analysis. The result of the 
EFA is shown in table 3 above. 
In structural equation modeling (SEM), the measurement model is evaluated first to confirm 
the measurement adequacy of the items for the construct. The second stage involves the 
evaluation of the structural model, which shows a regression-like relationship between the 
constructs as shown in the theoretical model (Fig. 1) above. This two-stage approach will 
overcome the problem of localizing the source of poor model fit associated with other single-
step approach (Kline, 1998). However, before proceeding to SEM data analysis, it is 
necessary to test the validity of the two constructs. Having ascertained both the internal 
consistency of the items (see table 4), and the EFA test above. Next section discusses 
construct validity.       
 
Measurement Error in SEM 
 
An important question is how do we represent theoretical concepts and then quantify the 
amount of measurement error? In this paper, the measurement model enabled the researcher 
to use all the questionnaire measured items to adequately define the two latent constructs, 
and then the model has been used to assess the extent of measurement error known as the 




reliability. From the stakeholder perspective, enforcement structure is complex, and can have 
many dimensions. Hence the design of the best 9 items to measure the construct. However, 
in its most basic form, measurement error is due to inaccurate responses, data entry errors, 
interpreting questions different from what the researcher intended, or natural degree of 
respondents’ inconsistency when multiple items are used to measure same construct (Hair et 
al., 2010). With the application of CFA, it becomes easier to assess the contribution of each 
indicator and then measure how well the combined set of indicators represent the latent 
constructs (reliability and validity). This study has been able to incorporate the extent of the 





Reliability is an assessment of the degree of consistency between multiple measurements of 
a variable. The first measures considered in this paper is the reliability coefficient, which 
assesses the entire scale, with Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 1) being the most widely used 
measure (Hair et al., 2010). Generally, reliability is inversely related to measurement error. 
In other words, as reliability goes up, the relationships between a latent construct and the 
indicators are greater, meaning that the construct explains more of the variance in each 
indicator. If reliability is 1, i.e. 100%, then measurement error is 0. But in statistical reality, 
no indicator items can perfectly define a latent constructs. SEM offers the advantage of 
automatically accounting for measurement errors. Also available are reliability measures 
derived from confirmatory factor analysis, such as the composite reliability. In table 4 below, 
the range of the factor loadings for the construct enforcement structure is 0.761 to 0.821. 
This is the correlation between the original construct and the indicator factors, with higher 
loadings making the construct representative of the factor. Squared factor loadings indicate 
what percentage of the variance in an original construct is explained by a factor. For example, 
the 0.761 loading on item RG1 explains 57.9% of the variance of the construct enforcement 
structure. In sum, for all practical and statistical significance, factor loadings for the two 
latent constructs – enforcement structure and board performance exceeded the 0.50 threshold 
set by Hair et al. (2010). Similar with the standard deviation of any set of data values, the 
standard error is the expected variation of an estimated regression coefficient, but instead 
denotes the expected range of the coefficient across multiple samples of the data. It is usually 
useful in statistical tests of significance that test to see whether the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero. It has been affirmed by Hair et al. (2110) that reliability is also an 
indicator of convergent validity, and that different reliability coefficients do not produce 
dramatically different reliability estimates, but a slightly different composite reliability 
value. It is computed from the squared sum of factor loadings for each construct and the sum 
of the error variance terms for a construct as represented by A/A+B. The higher composite 
reliability values of 0.905 and 0.901 in table 4 (enforcement structure) and table 5 (board 
performance) respectively confirm the assertion that sometimes Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 























Enforcement RG1 0.761 0.579 0.042  A/A+B 
 RG2 0.812 0.659 0.047   
 RG3 0.813 0.661 0.049   
 MT1 0.821 0.674 0.089   
 MT2 0.813 0.661 0.088   
 MT3 0.779 0.607 0.087   
   
A Ʃ 3.841 
B Ʃ 






Table 5: Composite Reliability (Board Performance) 












Board Performance MN1 0.788 0.621 0.054  A/A+B 
 MN2 0.85 0.722 0.067   
 MN3 0.696 0.484 0.057   
 SV1 0.68 0.462 0.063   
 SV2 0.86 0.739 0.063   
 SV3 0.686 0.471 0.065   
 SV4 0.789 0.623 0.056   
 NT1 0.6 0.360 0.065   
 NT2 0.762 0.581 0.064   










A measure may be internally consistent (reliable) as above, but not accurate enough to 
measure a particular construct (valid). Construct validity is the extent to which a set of 
measured items actually reflects the theoretical latent construct those items are designed to 
measure (Hair et al, 2010). A fundamental assessment of construct validity involves the 
measurement relationships between items and constructs (i.e., the path estimates linking 
construct to indicator variables). In CFA application, larger standardized loading estimates 
confirm that the indicators are strongly related to their associated constructs and are one 
indication of construct validity. Rules of thumb suggest that standardized loading estimates 
should be at least 0.5 and ideally 0.7 or higher. Low loadings suggest that a measured variable 
is a candidate for deletion from the model (Hair et al., 2010). A more appropriate idea to 
discuss construct validity for CFA/SEM is the convergent validity. The items that are 
indicators of a specific construct should converge or share a high proportion of variance in 
common, known as convergent validity (Hair et al., 2010). One of the important ways 
available to estimate the relative amount of convergent validity is: high loadings on a factor 
would indicate that they converge on a latent construct. Since the standardized parameter 
estimates are constrained to range between – 1.0 and + 1.0, Hair et al. (2010) stated that, a 
good rule of thumb is that standardized loading estimates (R) should have a regression weight 
0.5 or higher, and ideally 0.7 or higher. Looking at tables 6 & 7 below, all the items have R 
value < 0.5. Also, with the exception of MN1, MN2, and RG2, with R value 0.600, 0.607, 
and 0.638 respectively, all the other items have R ≤ 0.7. The rationale behind this can be 
understood in each item’s communality, which represents the amount of variance accounted 
for by the factor solution for each item. In this paper, all the items have been assessed to 
meet acceptable levels of explanation, i.e. < 0.5.  The square of a standardized factor loading 
represents how much variation in an item is explained by the latent construct and is termed 
the variance extracted, sometimes referred to as squared multiple correlation (SMC). Result 
of the tables 6 and 7 below indicate acceptable construct validity because the figure 0.992 
for construct reliability is > that of variance extracted, 0.931 for the construct board 
performance, and 0.971 for construct reliability is > that of variance extracted, 0.919. 
 
 






















         
MN 1 0.600 0.360   0.034    
MN 2 0.607 0.368   0.053    
MN 3 0.709 0.503   0.003    
SV 1 0.700 0.489   0.038    
SV 2 0.725 0.526   0.036    
SV 3 0.727 0.529   0.038    
SV 4 0.740 0.548   0.027    
NT 1 0.757 0.573   0.036    
NT 2 0.730 0.533   0.037    
 Ʃ 
6.294 











         
 





























        
RG 1 0.814 0.663   0.04
4 
   
RG 2 0.638 0.407   0.03
9 
   
RG 3 0.591 0.349   0.04
1 










         
 
 
The Enforcement Structure  Measurement Model (CFA) 
In a CFA model, the Squared Multiple Correlation (SMC) values represent the extent to 
which a measured variable’s variance is explained by a latent construct. The rules provided 
for the factor standardized loading estimates tend to produce the same diagnostics because 
SMC are a function of the loading estimates regardless of whether the researcher is 
estimating in a congeneric measurement model, CFA or path model with latent constructs 
(Holmes-Smith et al., 2006). In addition, a major component of construct validity is 
convergent validity – items that are indicators of a specific construct should converge or 
share a high proportion of variance in common. Factor loadings, variance extracted (or 
SMC), average variance extracted (AVE) and construct reliability are some of the available 
ways to estimate the relative amount of convergent validity. In general, researches report at 
least one of the three models-based estimates of reliability: construct reliability, SMC or VE 
(Bollen, 1989).   
In this paper, I estimate the relative amount of convergent validity because both construct 
reliability and variance extracted are shown (see table 6 and 7 above), and also the SMC 
loadings have been used to measure the construct validity. As mentioned earlier, the SMC 




for a measured variable is the square of the indicator’s standardized loadings. In other words, 
from the default outputs in the SEM figures below, it is estimated that the predictors of reg1 
(indicator) explain 81.4% of its variance (i.e., the error variance of reg1 is approximately 
18.6% of the variance of reg1 itself). Thus, the SMC value threshold of a good observed 
variable should be .5 and above (Hair et al. 2010). Nevertheless, 0.3 indicates an acceptable 
item variable (Holmes-Smith et al., 2006) especially when the indicators for a construct are 
not more than 3 provided other constructs have higher indicators. A standardized factor 
loading of 0.7 for an observed variable is roughly the equivalent of 0.5 SMC. From the CFA 
analysis of the enforcement model, six items present offending estimates. The remaining 3 
items of reg1, reg2, and reg3 are retained based on the AMOS modification indices output, 

























Table 8: Squared Multiple Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   Estimate 
Board Role_Performance   .850 
ntwrk2   .533 
ntwrk1   .573 
serv4   .547 
serv3   .529 
serv2   .526 
serv1   .489 
mntrg3   .503 
mntrg2   .369 
mntrg1   .360 
reg3   .349 
reg2   .407 
reg1   .662 
 
reg1 <--- Enforcement .814 
reg2 <--- Enforcement .638 















Table 9: Hypothesized Regression Weight Among Latent Constructs  
   Estimate S.E. C.R. P Status 
Board Role_Performance <--- Enforcement .082 .116 .708 .479 Not Sig 
 
 
reg1 <--- Enforcement 1.000     
reg2 <--- Enforcement .861 .158 5.454 *** par_13 
reg3 <--- Enforcement .827 .156 5.307 *** par_14 
*** P value is statistically significant at 0.01 level 
mntrg3 <--- Board Role_Performance 1.000     
serv1 <--- Board Role_Performance 1.340 .174 7.698 *** par_5 
serv2 <--- Board Role_Performance 1.365 .176 7.762 *** par_6 
serv3 <--- Board Role_Performance 1.343 .179 7.501 *** par_7 
ntwrk2 <--- Board Role_Performance 1.200 .172 6.980 *** par_8 
*** P value is statistically significant at 0.01 level 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper began by arguing that significant enforcement agencies are a major stakeholder 
in business organizations. Like other contractual stakeholders, stake-keepers (regulators) 
help in instituting the required legal framework, and monitoring compliance using the 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms approved by country or firm law as a code of conduct 
for the organizations. Though a number of reports have used other factors to raise the 
importance of enforcement in the corporate governance structure; a typical example is the 
well-known survey in the transition economies viewpoint by Berglof and Claessens (2004), 
and the specific World Bank (2005) report on Nigeria. A central claim of this paper is that 
board performance is a key mechanism of corporate governance that is shaped by the 
structural forces of sharing a firm’s enforcement structures by statutory regulators as the 
stake-keepers, as argued by Fassin (2009). In this context, the country’s regulatory 
framework or the firms’ conventional norms are the major  of considerations. Though it is 
difficult to say which of the approaches is superior to the other, but it can be rightly affirmed 
that both internal and external enforcements are key to effective corporate governance 
(Berglof & Claessens, 2004).  
 




An important finding in this study is that the proposed manifest variables of the latent 
construct enforcement structure (exogenous variable) – regulatory framework, monitoring 
compliance, and enforcement mechanisms have been confirmed to be acceptable measures 
of enforcement structure. Similarly, for the construct board performance (endogenous 
variable), the proposed indicator variables – board monitoring, board service, and board 
networking have been confirmed to be good measures of the construct. However, board 
service items are stronger because three items are retained after all the modification processes 
to achieve model fit. In addition, after performing the CFA, only three items in the dimension 
regulatory framework were retained.     
Within the overall model, the estimates of the structural coefficients provide the basis for 
testing the proposed hypothesis. As expected, enforcement structure factors are not 
significantly related to board performance, thus supporting the proposed hypothesis. In other 
words, the regression weights for enforcement structure in the prediction of board 
performance is insignificantly different from zero even at 10% level as shown in Table 9 
above (0.479). In other words, enforcement structure and board performance show weak path 
(0.082), and statistically insignificant, but the hypothesis is supported because it goes in line 
with the proposed theory that found weak enforcement mechanisms in Nigeria  In addition, 
the table confirms the statistical significance of all the 18 measures of the stakeholder model. 
The three stars *** in the P column indicates that the probability of getting a critical ratio as 
large as 5.454 in absolute value is less than 0.001. In other words, the regression weight for 
Enforcement Structure in the prediction of reg2 is significantly different from zero at the 
0.001 level (two-tailed). Same with 5.307 in absolute value is less than 0.001. In other words, 
the regression weight for Enforcement Structure in the prediction of reg3 is also significantly 
different from zero at the 0.001 level. Same goes with the other endogenous construct (board 
performance)  with all their measured items.   
This study findings does not contradict the findings in the literature, which stated that 
enforcement is key to effective corporate governance especially in emerging markets 
(Berglof & Claessens, 2004; World Bank, 2005; Okike, 2004; 2007; and Okpara, 2009). 
Thus, the research objective of examining enforcement structure is insignificantly related to 
board performance have been achieved, answering the research question in the affirmative, 
consistent with the literature. However, not all the items provided in the initial proposed 
theoretical model actually measures the two constructs – enforcement structure and board 
role performance. Hence, the reason for deleting such items as suggested by AMOS estimates 
output in the modification indices.    
  
 
